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Abstract. Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption can protect privacy
of the receiver. However, there are some situations that we need to re-
cover the identity of the receiver, for example a dispute occurs or the
privacy mechanism is abused. In this paper, we propose a new con-
cept, referred to as Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption with Identity
Recovery(AIBEIR), which is an anonymous IBE with identity recovery
property. There is a party called the Identity Recovery Manager(IRM)
who has a secret key to recover the identity from the ciphertext in our
scheme. We construct it with an anonymous IBE and a special IBE which
we call it testable IBE. In order to ensure the semantic security in the
case where the identity recovery manager is an adversary, we define a
stronger semantic security model in which the adversary is given the se-
cret key of the identity recovery manager. To our knowledge, we propose
the first AIBEIR scheme and prove the security in our defined model.
Keywords: IBE, anonymous, identity recovery, testable
1 Introduction
Public key encryption is one of the most important primitives in cryptography,
which was presented in the great paper titled “New Directions in Cryptograph”
in 1976 [DH76]. Public key encryption solves the problem that the sender and the
receiver should share a common secret key which is not known to the adversary
before communicating. One of the disadvantages in public key encryption is
using certificate to bind the public key to the identity of its owner. The issue of
management of certificates is complex and cumbersome.
In 1984, Shamir [Sha84] introduced the concept of Identity-Based Encryp-
tion (IBE) which solved the problem. IBE is a generalization of public key
encryption where the public key of a user can be arbitrary string such as an
e-mail address. The first realizations of IBE are given by [SOK00,BF01] using
groups equipped with bilinear maps. Since then, realizations from bilinear maps
⋆ A preliminary version of this work will appear in the proceedings of ACISP 2018
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[BB04a,BB04b,Wat05,Gen06,Wat09], from quadratic residues modulo compos-
ite [Coc01,BGH07], from lattices [GPV08,CHKP10,ABB10,Boy10] and from the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [DG17] have been proposed.
In order to protect the privacy of the receiver, Boyen [Boy03] first explic-
itly stated the concept of anonymous IBE3, where the ciphertext does not leak
the identity of the recipient. In fact, [BF01] is the first anonymous IBE scheme
although they did not state it explicitly. Since then, there are some follow-up
works realized from bilinear maps [BW06], from quadratic residues modulo com-
posite [AG09], from lattices [GPV08,ABB10] and from the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption[BLSV17].
Anonymous IBE protects the privacy of the message and the receiver’s iden-
tity in the meantime, but we can only recover the message. However, there are
some situations where we need to recover the identity of the receiver, for example
a dispute occurs or the privacy mechanism is abused. In a mail system, there
is a need to keep the receiver anonymous for everyone except the mail sever
who will forward the mail to the receiver. So can we extract the identity from
an anonymous IBE ciphertext with some secret information? In this paper, we
present a new primitive called anonymous identity-based encryption with identity
recovery(AIBEIR) which can solve this problem. AIBEIR is a special anonymous
IBE which has an additional property that the identity recovery manager can
recover the identity with a secret key. But the identity recovery manager can
not get any information of the message from the ciphertext. Formally, AIBEIR
is semantic secure even when the identity recovery manager is the adversary.
1.1 Motivations
On the one hand, anonymity protects user’s privacy. On the other hand, un-
conditional privacy may lose supervision and cause illegal behavior. To balance
the anonymity and accountability in anonymous IBE schemes, PKG can send
the recovery key to a manager who takes charge of recovering identities of sus-
pected ciphertexts. A similar notion was presented in group signature where a
group manager can reveal the member identity registered to is group. But there
is a subtlety that signature can be verified while general encryption does not
have verifiable property. If a mole want to communicate with his partners, he
will choose other secure encryption schemes other than encryption schemes with
recovery property. In fact, it is inefficient if every ciphertext should be verified
before delivering. So we can just restrict that the anonymous IBE with recovery
is the only choice. For example, in the army, the internal communication tool is
deployed with anonymous IBE with recovery. If some ciphertext is suspected to
contain sensible data which is not allowed to send to the recipient.
In fact, anonymous IBE with recovery identity subdivides the privacy which
makes the ciphertext anonymous for all users except some privileged supervisors.
Imagine that how can an anonymous IBE encryption under the destination IP
3 In fact, Boyen gave an identity-based signcryption with a formalization of sender
and recipient anonymity
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption with Identity Recovery 3
address be transferred. Routers with recovery key can recover the corresponding
identities of the ciphertext which makes it viable. Similarly, in a mail system
deployed with anonymous IBE, the server does not know which one is the recip-
ient.
1.2 Our Contributions
We propose a new cryptographic primitive called anonymous IBE with identity
recovery. We first define the model and security notions of AIBEIR. We then
present a method to convert an anonymous IBE into AIBEIR with the help of
testable IBE and prove that the new scheme satisfies the security we defined.
A testable IBE is an IBE which can test whether ciphertext c is a ciphertext
under identity id given c and id. It is obvious that a testable IBE is not anony-
mous. We will show that [BB04a,Wat05] and their variations are testable IBEs.
AIBEIR consists of four parties, a Private Key Generator(PKG), an Identity
Recovery Manager(IRM), a sender, and a receiver. There are five procedures
in an AIBEIR scheme. They are setup procedure, extract procedure, encrypt
procedure, decrypt procedure and recover procedure.
Besides correctness and anonymity, we introduce two new security notions in
AIBEIR. The first is a stronger semantic security, where the identity recovery
manager is the adversary. The second is recovery, which ensures that the recovery
is reliable and no adversary can fool the identity recovery manager. Finally, We
prove the security of our AIBEIR scheme according to our security notions. To
the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first anonymous IBE scheme
with the identity recovery property.
To construct an AIBEIR scheme, we first encrypt the plaintext by a testable
IBE and encrypt the testable IBE ciphertext using an anonymous IBE. Moreover,
we encrypt the receiver’s identity under the recovery manager’s identity. The
anonymity is guaranteed by the anonymous IBE and the stronger CPA security
is guaranteed by the security of the testable IBE. Given the master secret key
of the anonymous IBE, identity recovery manager obtains the identity and the
testable IBE ciphertext by decrypting corresponding ciphertext, respectively.
Then, check whether the testable IBE ciphertext is under the identity and output
the identity if the test algorithm outputs 1.
1.3 Related Work
Identity-based cryptosystems were introduced by Shamir [Sha84]. The first re-
alizations of IBE were given by Boneh, Franklin[BF01] and Sakai et al [SOK00].
Boneh and Franklin gave the security model and their proposal is the first anony-
mous IBE. The anonymity was first noticed by Boyen [Boy03]. Another view of
Anonymous IBE is as a combination of identity-based encryption with the prop-
erty of key privacy, which was introduced by Bellare et al [BBDP01]. A similar
concept called Identity-Based Group Encryption(IBGE) was presented by Xil-
ing et al [LRL+16]. Traceability in their scheme is similar to recovery in ours.
But there are some differences between IBGE and AIBEIR. On the one hand,
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we do not have Verify algorithm which is used to verify whether the ciphertext
belongs to the group. On the other hand, our construction is implemented by
IBEs while they utilized PKE, IBE and ZKP(Zero-Knowledge Proofs) to con-
struct their scheme. We do not think their scheme is a “pure” IBE because of the
use of PKE. Recently, [GSRD17] pointed that the zero-knowledge proof used in
[LRL+16] leaks much more information, due to which the verifier who is honest
but curious will be able to identify the designated recipient. They proposed a
construction with six random oracles.
1.4 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce definitions that
we use throughout the paper including a definition of anonymous identity-based
encryption and testable identity-based encryption. In Sect. 3, we show the syntax
and security of the new primitive anonymous identity-based encryption with
identity recovery. In Sect. 4, we present the construction of AIBEIR and prove
its security. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
We denote s
$
←− S as the operation of assigning to s an element selected uniformly
at random from set S. The notation x← A(·) denotes the operation of running
an algorithm A with some given input and assigning the output to x. A function
negl: N → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial poly and sufficiently
large λ, it holds that negl(λ)<1/poly(λ). We use 0ℓto denote the zero vector
whose length is ℓ. If a is a vector, |a| denotes its length.
2.1 Bilinear Groups
Let G1,G2 and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1,g2
be generators of groups G1 and G2, respectively, and e : G1 × G2 → GT be a
bilinear map that holds the following features:
– Bilinearity: e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab for all u ∈ G1,v ∈ G2 and a,b ∈ Zp.
– Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT
– Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any
input pair u ∈ G1,v ∈ G2.
We assume a symmetric bilinear map such that G1 = G2 = G and g1 = g2 = g.
2.2 Identity-Based Encryption
Let λ be a security parameter. An identity-based encryption is a tuple of al-
gorithms ΠIBE = (IBE.Setup,IBE.Extract,IBE.Encrypt,IBE.Decrypt) with the fol-
lowing properties:
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• Setup(1λ): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input 1λ and
outputs the system parameter mpk and a master secret key msk.
• Extract(id,msk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input
user’s identity id and master secret key msk, and outputs the user’s corre-
sponding private key skid.
• Encrypt(m, id,mpk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as in-
put a messagem in the message space, system parametermpk, the receiver’s
identity id and outputs a ciphertext c in the ciphertext space.
• Decrypt(mpk, c, skid): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as
input system parameter mpk, ciphertext c, user’s private key skid, outputs
the message m in the message space.
Correctness.We require correctness of decryption: that is, for all λ, all identity
id in the identity space, allm in the specified message space, Pr[Decrypt(mpk,skid,
Encrypt(m, id,mpk)) = m] = 1 − negl(λ) holds, where the probability is taken
over the randomness of the algorithms.
Anonymity and Semantic security. When the ciphertext can not reveal
information of the message, we say that the cryptosystem is chosen-plaintext
secure. We say that the cryptosystem is anonymous if the ciphertext can not
reveal information of the identity of the receiver. We combine these two notions.
Definition 1 An IBE scheme is anonymous against chosen-identity and chosen-
plaintext attacks if there does not exist any polynomial adversary A who has
non-negligible advantage in the following game:
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and
runs the Setup algorithm of the IBE. It provides A with the system parameters
mpk while keeping the master secret key msk to itself.
Phase 1: The adversary A can make any polynomial key-extraction queries
defined as follows: key-extraction query (id): The adversary A can choose an
identity id and sends it to the challenger. The challenger generates a secret key
skid of id and returns it to A.
Challenge:When A decides that Phase 1 is complete, it chooses two equal-
length plaintexts m0,m1 and two identities id0, id1 under the constraint that
they have not been asked for the private keys. The challenger chooses uniformly
at random two bits b ∈ {0, 1}, γ ∈ {0, 1} and sends a ciphertext c∗ of mb as the
challenge ciphertext under idγ to A.
Phase 2: The adversary A can also make queries just like Phase 1 except
that it cannot make a key-extraction query of either id0 or id1.
Guess: A outputs a guess (b′, γ′) of (b, γ).
We define the advantage of the adversary A as AdvA = |Pr[b = b
′ ∧ γ =
γ′]− 14 |.
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2.3 Testable Identity-Based Encryption
Definition 2 An Identity-Based Encryption is testable if there exists an algo-
rithm Test(·, ·) which takes as input c and an identity id and returns 1 if c is a
part of a valid cipertext under id and 0 otherwise.
Remark 1 In our construction, we need the testable IBE to satisfy an additional
property that the ciphertext c can be partitioned into two parts c0 and c1 where
c0 contains information of the identity but no information of the message while
c1 contains information of the message but no information of the identity. And
the test algorithm takes c0 other than c as input. Our construction works if
the testable IBE without this property. But if it is satisfied, our construction is
more efficient because encrypting the part containing information of plaintext is
sufficient. Moreover, to our knowledge, all of the existing testable IBEs satisfy
it.
Some realizations of IBE from bilinear maps such as [BB04a,Wat05] satisfy the
definition of testable IBE. We will prove that the scheme in [Wat05] is a testable
IBE.
Let G be a group of prime order, p, for which there exists an efficiently
computable bilinear map into G1. Additionally, let e : G × G → G1 denote
the bilinear map and g be the corresponding generator. The size of the group is
determined by the security parameter. Identities will be represented as bit strings
of length n, a separate parameter unrelated to p. The construction follows.
Setup.The system parameters are generated as follows. We choose a random
generator, g ∈ G and g2 randomly in G. We choose a secret α ∈ Zp and set
g1 = g
α. Further, choose a random value u′ ∈ G and a random n−length vector
U = (ui), whose elements are chosen at random from G. The published public
parameters are g, g1, g2, u
′, and U . The master secret key is gα2 .
Key Generation. Let v be a n-bit string representing an identity, vi denote the
ith bit of v, and V ⊆ {1, ..., n} be the set of all i for which vi = 1. (That is V is
the set of indices for which the bit string v is set to 1.) A private key for identity
v is generated as follows. First, a random r ∈ Zp is chosen. Then the private key
is constructed as:
dv = (g
α
2 (u
′
∏
i∈V
ui)
r, gr)
Encryption. A message M ∈ G1 is encrypted for an identity v as follows. A
value t ∈ Zp is chosen at random. The ciphertext is then constructed as:
C = (e(g1, g2)
tM, gt, (u′
∏
i∈V
ui)
t)
Decryption. Let C = (C1, C2, C3) be a valid encryption of M under the iden-
tity v. Then C can be decrypted by dv = (d1, d2) as:
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C1
e(d2,C3)
e(d1,C2)
= (e(g1, g2)
tM)
e(gr ,(u′
∏
i∈V
ui)
t)
e(gα
2
(u′
∏
i∈V
ui)r),gt
) = (e(g1, g2)
tM)
e(g,(u′
∏
i∈V
ui)
rt))
e(g1,g2)te((u′
∏
i∈V
ui)rt,g)
= M
We can also define a Test algorithm as follows:
Test.Let C = (C1, C2, C3) be a valid encryption under the identity v. Let
v′ be a n bit string representing an identity, v′i denote the ith bit of v
′, and
V ′ ⊆ {1, ..., n} be the set of all i for which v′i = 1. Output 1 if e(g, C3) =
e(C2, (u
′
∏
i∈V′
ui)) and ⊥ otherwise. In fact, (C1,C2) contain the information of
the message and no information of the identity. C3 contains information of the
identity but no information of the message. So it is a testable IBE.
3 Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption with Identity
Recovery
Compared to identity based encryption, there is an additional algorithm Recover
that takes recovery secret key and a ciphertext as inputs and output the corre-
sponding identity or ⊥ if the ciphertext is not valid. Let λ be a security param-
eter. An anonymous identity-based encryption with recovery is a tuple of algo-
rithmsΠAIBEIR = (AIBEIR.Setup,AIBEIR.Extract,AIBEIR.Encrypt,AIBEIR.Decrypt,
AIBEIR.Recover) with the following properties:
• Setup(1λ:) This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input 1λ and
outputs the system parameter mpk, a master secret key msk and secret key
of the identity recovery manager skIRM . Then PKG sends skIRM to the
identity recovery manager in a secret channel. It is operated by PKG.
• Extract(id,msk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input
a user’ identity id andmsk, outputs the user’ corresponding private key skid.
• Encrypt(m,mpk, id): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as in-
put a message m in a specified message space, system parameter mpk, the
receiver’ identity id and outputs a ciphertext c in the ciphertext space. It is
operated by the sender.
• Decrypt(mpk, c, skid): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as
input system parameter mpk, ciphertext c, user’ private key skid, outputs
the message m in the message space. It is operated by the receiver.
• Recover(c, skIRM ): The identity recovery manager outputs an identity id if c
is a valid cipertext under id and ⊥ otherwise. It is operated by the identity
recovery manager.
Correctness. We say that ΠAIBEIR is correct if it satisfies the following two
properties:
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• Decryption correctness: For any id in identity space and m in a specified
message space, Pr[AIBEIR.Decrypt(skid,AIBEIR.Encrypt(m,id,mpk)) = m] =
1− negl(λ).
• Recovery correctness: For any valid ciphertext c = AIBEIR.Encrypt(m, id,
mpk), Pr[Recover(skIRM ,c) = id] = 1− negl(λ).
Anonymity. The anonymity of AIBEIR is the same as that of anonymous IBE.
Note that the recovery manager can not be the adversary.
Stronger semantic security. In the semantic security model of IBE, adversary
has no information about the master secret key msk. But in the definition of
our AIBEIR scheme, the identity recovery manager holds skIRM which makes it
more powerful. So if the identity recovery manager is the adversary, the semantic
security model of IBE is not feasible. We define a stronger semantic security as
follows:
Definition 3 An AIBEIR scheme is strongly semantic secure against chosen-
identity and chosen-plaintext attacks if there does not exist any polynomial ad-
versary A who have non-negligible advantage in the game below:
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and
runs the Setup algorithm of the AIBEIR. It provides A with the system public
parameters mpk and identity recovery secret key skIRM while keeping the mas-
ter secret key msk to itself.
Phase 1: The adversary A can make any polynomial key-extraction queries
defined as follows: key-extraction query (id): A can choose an identity id and
send it to the challenger. The challenger generates secret key skid and returns
it to A.
Challenge:When A decides that Phase 1 is complete, it chooses two equal-
length plaintexts m0,m1 and an identity id
∗ under the constraint that it has
not asked for the private key and sends them to the challenger. The challenger
chooses uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends a ciphertext c∗ =
Encrypt(mb, id
∗,mpk) as the challenge ciphertext to A.
Phase 2: A can also make queries just like Phase 1 except that it cannot
make a key-extraction query of id∗.
Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b.
We define the advantage of adversary A as AdvA = |Pr[b = b
′]− 12 |
Recovery. An AIBEIR scheme is recoverable if Recover algorithm can always
extract the right identity from a valid ciphertext and output ⊥ when the input
is an invalid ciphertext.
Definition 4 An AIBEIR scheme is recoverable if there does not exist any PPT
adversary A who wins the following game with non-negligible probability.
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Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of the AIBEIR. It provides A with the system
parameters mpk while keeping the master secret key msk and skIRM to itself.
Monitor Phase: The adversaryA can query recover oracle and key-extraction
oracle.
Challenge:When A decides that Monitor Phase is complete, the adversary
sends c∗ to the challenger. The challenger sends the output of Recover algorithm
to A.
Output: A wins the game if the output of Recover(c∗, skIRM ) is ⊥ or
id while c∗ is a valid ciphertext under id′ where id 6= id′ or the output of
Recover(c∗, skIRM ) is id while c
∗ is not a valid ciphertext. Here we require id
has not been asked as a key-extraction query for the need to prove the security.
4 A Construction from Anonymous IBE and Testable
IBE
In this section, we present our construction of AIBEIR from anonymous IBE and
testable IBE. Let Π1 = (A-IBE.Setup,A-IBE.Enc,A-IBE.Dec,A-IBE.Extract) be an
anonymous IBE scheme,Π2 = (T-IBE.Setup,T-IBE.Enc,T-IBE.Dec,T-IBE.Extract,
T-IBE.Test) be a testable IBE scheme. Let idǫ denote the identity of the identity
recovery manager in scheme Π2. Then, we can construct an AIBEIR scheme Π
as follows:
4.1 The Construction
We describe our AIBEIR scheme (AIBEIR.Setup, AIBEIR.Extract, AIBEIR.Encrypt,
AIBEIR.Decrypt,AIBEIR.Recover) as follows:
• Setup(1λ): Run the Setup algorithms of A-IBE and T-IBE and obtain (MPKA,
MSKA) ← A-IBE.Setup(1
λ) , (MPKT ,MSKT ) ←T-IBE.Setup(1
λ) , re-
spectively. Compute SKT,idǫ = T-IBE.Extract(MSKT , idǫ). (mpk,msk) =
((MPKA,MPKT ), (MSKA,MSKT )) ,skIRM = (MSKA, SKT,idǫ).
• Extract(id,msk): Run the Extract algorithms of A-IBE and T-IBE and obtain
SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MSKA) and SKT,id = T-IBE.Extract(id,MSKT ),
respectively. Output skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id).
• Encrypt(m, id,mpk): Run the Encrypt algorithms of A-IBE and T-IBE and
obtain (c0, c1) = T-IBE.Enc(m, id,MPKT ), c2 = A-IBE.Enc(c0, id,
MPKA) and c3 = T-IBE.Enc(id, idǫ,MPKT ). Output c = (c1, c2, c3).
• Decrypt(mpk, c, skid): Parse c as c1, c2 and c3. Then compute c0 = A-IBE.Dec(
c2, SKA,id), m = T-IBE.Dec(c0||c1, SKT,id).
• Recover(c, skIRM ): Parse c as c1, c2 and c3. Parse skIRM as MSKA and
SKT,idǫ . Then compute id= T-IBE.Dec(c3, SKT,idǫ) and SKA,id = A-IBE.Ext
ract(id,MSKA). Take as input SKA,id and c2 , obtain the cipertext c0 by
running the Decrypt algorithm of A-IBE.Dec(SKA,id, c2). Finally, output id
if T-IBE.Test(id, c0) = 1, and ⊥ otherwise.
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Remark 2 Here the message space of Π1 includes the ciphertext space of Π2.
We set the intersection of identity space of Π1 and Π2 as the identity space of
Π.
4.2 Correctness
Theorem 1 If Π1 is a correct anonymous IBE scheme and Π2 is a correct
testable IBE scheme then Π is a correct AIBEIR scheme.
• Decryption correctness: The decryption correctness is guaranteed by the
decryption correctness of Π1 and Π2.
• Recovery correctness: The recovery correctness is guaranteed by the de-
cryption correctness of Π1 , Π2 and test correctness of Π2.
4.3 Anonymity
Theorem 2 If Π1 is an IBE scheme which is anonymous against adaptively
chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks and Π2 is a testable IBE scheme
which is fully secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks, then
Π is an AIBEIR scheme which is anonymous against adaptively chosen-identity
and chosen-plaintext attacks.4
Proof. We prove the above theorem by hybrid arguments.
H0: This hybrid is the real experiment in the Definition 1. The logic of the
challenger is shown as follows:
initialization:
(MPKA,MSKA)← A-IBE.Setup(1
λ) , (MPKT ,MSKT )←T-IBE.Setup(1
λ)
(mpk,msk) = ((MPKA,MPKT ), (MSKA,MSKT ))
SKT,idǫ = T-IBE.Extract(MSKT , idǫ), skIRM = (MSKA, SKT,idǫ)
send mpk to A
upon receiving a secret key query(id):
SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MSKA) and SKT,id = T-IBE.Extract(id,MSKT )
send skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A
upon receiving the challenge query (m0,m1, id0, id1):
b
$
←− {0, 1} ,γ
$
←− {0, 1},
(1) (c0, c1) = T-IBE.Enc(mb, idγ ,MPKT )
(2) c2 = A-IBE.Enc(c0, idγ ,MPKA)
(3) c3 = T-IBE.Enc(idγ , idǫ,MPKT )
send c = (c1, c2, c3) to A
4 Here the adversary can not be the identity recovery manager and has PPT power.
If AIBE and TIBE are both selective secure, our AIBEIR scheme is also selective
secure.
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H1: In this hybrid, it is identical to H0 except that we just change how the
challenge ciphertext is generated. We replace the lines marked (1) in H0 as
follows:
c0, c1 = T-IBE.Enc(0
|mb|, idγ ,MPKT ).
H2: Compared to H1, we replace the lines marked (2) in H0 as follows:
c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0
|c0|, idγ ,MPKA).
H3: Same as H2, except we replace the lines marked (2) in H0 as follows:
We just randomly choose id from identity space except id0 and id1. We then
set c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0
|c0|, id,MPKA).
H4: Identical to H3, except we replace the lines marked (3) in H0 as follows:
We just set c3 as T-IBE.Enc(0
|idγ|, idǫ,MPKT ).
It is easy to know that the challenge ciphertext in H4 contains no information
about b and γ (except their length). So the advantage of A in H4 is 0. We prove
the above theorem by showing that H0 ≈ H1 ≈ H2 ≈ H3 ≈ H4 through the
following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Any PPT adversary cannot distinguish H0 and H1, if scheme Π2 is
fully secure against adaptively chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. We can construct a simulator B to break the full security against chosen-
identity and chosen-plaintext attacks of scheme Π2, if there is an adversary A
who can distinguish H0 and H1.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π2. It provides B with the system parame-
ters MPKT while keeping the master secret key MSKT to itself. B computes
(MPKA,MSKA)← A-IBE.Setup(1
λ), and sends MPK = (MPKA,MPKT ) to
A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an
identity id to B, B just forwards it as the key-extraction query to the challenger.
The challenger sends SKT,id to B. B computes SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MSKA)
and sends skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A.
Challenge: A chooses id0 and id1 under the constraint that they have not
been asked for the private keys and two equal-length messagesm0,m1 and sends
them to B. B just chooses randomly two bits b and γ and sends (mb,0, idγ) to the
challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit b′ and sends c0, c1
= T-IBE.Enc(m, idγ,MPKT ) to B. If b
′ = 0, m = mb. If b
′ = 1,m = 0. B obtains
c2, c3 by running A-IBE.Enc(c0, idγ ,MPKA) and T-IBE.Enc(idγ, idǫ,MPKT ) re-
spectively. B just sends c∗ = (c1, c2, c3) to A.
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Phase 2: A makes key-extraction queries except id0, id1. B answers queries
just like Phase 1.
Guess A sends a bit b¯ as a guess of Hb¯ to B. B just forwards it to the chal-
lenger.
The view of A is identical to H0 if b
′ = 0 and to H1 if b
′ = 1. Thus, by the
semantic security of scheme Π2, we can conclude that H0 ≈ H1.
Lemma 2 Any PPT adversary cannot distinguish H1 and H2, if scheme Π1 is
anonymous against adaptive-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. Given a PPT adversary A who can distinguish H1 and H2, we can con-
struct a simulator B attacking the anonymous security of Π1 against adaptive-
identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π1. It provides B with the system parame-
ters MPKA while keeping the master secret key MSKA to itself. B computes
(MPKT ,MSKT )← T-IBE.Setup(1
λ), and sends MPK = (MPKA,MPKT ) to
A.
Phase 1: When A makes key-extraction query and sends an identity id to
B, B just forwards id as the key-extraction query to the challenger. The chal-
lenger sends SKA,id to B. B runs SKT,id = T-IBE.Extract(id,MSKT ) and sends
skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m0,m1 and two identities
id0, id1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys
and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ′ ∈ {0, 1} and com-
putes c0, c1 = T-IBE.Enc(0, idγ′ ,MPKT ), c3 = T-IBE.Enc(idγ′, idǫ,MPKT ). B
sends (c0,0,idγ′ ,idγ′ )to the challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at ran-
dom a bit γ and a bit b. If b=0, the challenger sends c2 = A-IBE.Enc(c0, idγ′ ,MPKA)
to B. If b =1, the challenger sends c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, idγ′ ,MPKA) to B. B sends
(c1, c2, c3) to A.
Phase 2: B answers queries just like Phase 1, but id0 and id1 cannot be
queried.
Guess: A sends a bit b¯ as a guess of Hb¯+1 to B. B randomly choose a bit γ
and sends b¯ and γ to the challenger.
If b = 0, the view of A is identical to H1. If b = 1, the view of A is identical
to H2. We can see that H1 ≈ H2 by the anonymity of Π1.
Lemma 3 Any PPT adversary cannot distinguish H2 and H3, if scheme Π1 is
anonymous secure against adaptively chosen-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
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Proof. Given a PPT adversary A who can distinguish H2 and H3, we can con-
struct a simulator B attacking the anonymous security of Π1 against adaptively
chosen-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π1. It provides B with the system parame-
ters MPKA while keeping the master secret key MSKA to itself. B computes
(MPKT ,MSKT )←T-IBE.Setup(1
λ), and sendsmpk = (MPKA,MPKT ) to A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an
identity id to B, B just forwards id as the key-extraction query to the challenger.
The challenger sends SKA,id to B. B obtains SKT,id = T-IBE.Extract(id,MSKT )
and sends skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m0,m1 and two identities
id0, id1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys
and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ′ ∈ {0, 1} and com-
putes c0, c1 = T-IBE.Enc(0, idγ′ ,MPKT ), c3 = T-IBE.Enc(idγ′, idǫ,MPKT ). B
randomly chooses an identity id from identity space except id0, id1 and sends
(0,0,idγ′ , id )to the challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a
bit γ and a bit b.If γ =0 ,the challenger sends c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, idγ′ ,MPKA)
to B. If γ =1 ,the challenger sends c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, id,MPKA) to B. B sends
(c1, c2, c3) to A.
Phase 2: B answers queries just like Phase 1, but id0 and id1 cannot be
asked.
Guess: A sends a bit γ¯ as a guess of Hγ¯+2 to B. B randomly choose a bit b¯
and sends γ¯ and b¯ to the challenger.
If γ = 0, the view of A is identical inH2. If γ = 1, the view of A is identical in
H3.The probability that A can distinguish H2 and H3 equals |Pr[γ¯ = γ]−
1
2 | =
|2(14 +negl(n))−
1
2 | = negl(n) because of the anonymity of Π1. So the conclusion
is that H2 ≈ H3.
Lemma 4 Any PPT adversary cannot distinguish H3 and H4, if scheme Π2 is
secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. Given a PPT adversary A which can distinguish H3 and H4, we can
construct a simulator B attacking the semantic security of Π2 against chosen-
identity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π2 and obtains (MPKT ,MSKT ). It sends
MPKT to B and keeps MSKT to itself. B computes (MPKA,MSKA) ← A-
IBE.Setup(1λ) and sends mpk = (MPKA,MPKT ) to A.
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Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends
an identity id to B, B just forwards it as the key-extraction query to the
challenger. The challenger sends MSKT,id to B. B computes SKA,id = A-
IBE.Extract(id,MSKA) and sends skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m0,m1 and two identities
id0, id1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys
and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ ∈ {0, 1} and com-
putes c0, c1 = T-IBE.Enc(0, idγ ,MPKT ). B randomly chooses an identity id from
the identity space except id0, id1 and computes c2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, id,MPKA).
B sends (idγ ,0, idǫ)to the challenger.The challenger chooses uniformly at ran-
dom a bit b and sends c3 to B. c3 = T-IBE.Enc(idγ, idǫ,MPKT ), if b = 0. c3 =
T-IBE.Enc(0, idǫ,MPKT ), if b = 1. B just sends c
∗ = (c1, c2, c3) to A.
Phase 2: A makes key-extraction queries except id0, id1. B answers queries
just like Phase 1.
The view of A is identical to H3 if b = 0, and H4 otherwise. The probability
that the adversary can distinguishH3 andH4 equals the advantage of B breaking
the semantic security of Π2. So we can draw the conclusion that H3 ≈ H4.
Having proved the above lemmas, we have completed the proof of Theorem
2.
4.4 Stronger Semantic Security
Theorem 3 The AIBEIR scheme Π is strongly semantic secure if Π2 is se-
mantic secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attack.
Proof. We can construct a simulator B breaking semantic security of Π2 if there
exists an adversary A breaking the stronger semantic security of Π .
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π2 and obtains (MPKT ,MSKT ). It sends
MPKT to B and keeps MSKT to itself. B computes (MPKA,MSKA) ← A-
IBE.Setup(1λ). B obtains SKT,idǫ by making the secret key query of idǫ to the
challenger and sends mpk = (MPKA,MPKT ) and skIRM = (MSKA, SKT,idǫ)
to A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an
identity id to B, B just forwards it as the key-extraction query to the challenger.
The challenger sendsMSKT,id to B. B computes SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MS
KA) and sends skid = (SKA,id, SKT,id) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m0,m1 and an identity
id∗ under the constraint that it has not been asked for the private key and sends
them to B. B just forwards (m0,m1, id
∗) to the challenger. The challenger ran-
domly chooses a bit b and sends (c∗0, c
∗
1) = T-IBE.Enc(mb, id
∗,MPKT ). B com-
putes c∗2 = A-IBE.Enc(c
∗
0, id
∗,MPKA), c
∗
3 = T-IBE.Enc(id
∗, idǫ,MPKT ) and
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sends c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3) to A.
Phase 2: A makes key-extraction queries except id∗. B answers queries just
like Phase 1.
Guess: B just forwards the output of A to the challenger.
If A wins, we can see A as a distinguish oracle. When B obtains the challenge
ciphertext from challenger, B just encrypts it by the Encrypt algorithm of A-IBE
and sends it to A. We can see that the probability that A breaks the stronger
semantic security equals the probability that B breaks the semantic security of
Π2.
4.5 Recovery
Theorem 4 If the testable IBE scheme Π2 is secure against adaptive-identity
and chosen ciphertext attack, then the AIBEIR scheme Π satisfies recovery.
Proof. If the adversary wins in the recovery experiment, there are two cases: (1)
the adversary outputs a valid AIBEIR ciphertext but the challenger output ⊥ or
a wrong identity. This will not happen, which is guaranteed by the correctness of
Recover algorithm. (2) the adversary outputs an invalid AIBEIR ciphertext but
the challenger does not output ⊥. We just consider the case where (c1, c2, c3) is a
valid ciphertxt 5. In fact, if (c1, c2) is not a valid ciphertext, the receiver cannot
decrypt correctly using its secret key. And if c3 is not a valid T-IBE ciphertext
under idǫ, challenger will output ⊥.
If (c1, c2) is a valid ciphertext under id and c3 is a testable IBE ciphertext of
a different identity îd under idǫ, we can show that the identity recovery manager
will return ⊥ with overwhelming probability. In fact, if there exists a PPT ad-
versary A who can fool the identity recovery manager in the recovery game, we
can construct a simulator S attacking Π2 in adaptive-identity, chosen-plaintext
attack.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary)
and runs the Setup algorithm of Π2. It provides B with the system parame-
ters MPKT while keeping the master secret key MSKT to itself. B computes
(MPKA,MSKA) ← A-IBE.Setup(1
λ) and sends mpk = (MPKA,MPKT ) to
A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes the key-extraction queries, B just
forwards the identity queried by A to the challenger and obtains SKT,id from
the challenger. B obtains SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MSKA) and sends skid =
(SKA,id, SKT,id) to A. When A makes recover query, B gets SKT,idǫ by making
secret key query of idǫ to the challenger and obtains id by decrypting c3 using
5 Although c1, c2, c3 are all valid ciphertext, it maybe not a valid AIBEIR cipher-
text. Note that an AIBEIR ciphertext (c1, c2, c3) is valid where c1, c2, c3 are valid
ciphertexts under the same identity.
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SKT,idǫ . B computes SKA,id = A-IBE.Extract(id,MSKA) and then obtains c0 by
running Dec algorithm of A-IBE. B computes h = T-IBE.Test(c0, id), and sends
id to A if h = 1, and ⊥ otherwise. We say A wins if it outputs a valid “double-
encrypt” IBE ciphertext (c1, c2) under id1 and a valid testable IBE ciphertext
c3 of id2 which pass the recover algorithm
6(A can output the randomness used
in the encrypt algorithm to show it ). Here we constrain that id1 has not been
queried the private key before. B obtains SKT,id2 by making the secret key query
of id2.
Challenge: B randomly chooses two equal-length messagem0,m1 and sends
m0,m1 and id1 to challenger. Challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
obtains (c0, c1) = T-IBE.Enc(mb, id1,MPKT ).
Phase 2: B makes some queries to key-extraction oracle. In fact, B does not
need to query now.
Guess: B computes c2 = A-IBE.Enc(c0, id1,MPKA) and obtains c
′
0 which is
a part of ciphertext under id2 by decrypting c2 using SKA,id2. Then B obtains
m by decrypting c′0, c1 using SKT,id2 . B outputs 0 if m = m0 and 1 otherwise.
5 Conclusion
We define a new primitive called AIBEIR and construct it using double encryp-
tion with an anonymous IBE and a testable IBE. AIBEIR is anonymous for all
users except the identity recovery manager who can recover the identity from
the ciphertext. But the identity recovery manager can not obtain information
about plaintext from ciphertext even holding an identity recover secret key. To
our knowledge, [BB04a,Wat05] and their variations satisfy our testable IBE def-
inition. We leave as an open problem the question of constructing testable IBE
from other standard assumptions, such as lattice. Another interesting area of
research is to construct more practical AIBEIR schemes.
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